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“The challenge for Chile is to ensure that policy making and governance are 
democratized further.”
Chile’s Elites Face Demands for Reform
JENNIFER PRIBBLE
An estimated one million Chileans took to the streets in August 2016 to demand re-form of the country’s privatized pension 
system, calling for an end to individualized re-
tirement savings accounts, which were created in 
1981 during General Augusto Pinochet’s military 
dictatorship. The mobilization, involving around 
5 percent of the country’s population, was the 
largest since Chile’s return to democracy in 1990. 
Demonstrations of growing discontent have be-
come common in Chile of late. The pension pro-
tests came in the wake of more than five years of 
student mobilization aimed at forcing a reform of 
the Pinochet-era education system.
What accounts for this surge of protest in a 
country that has long prided itself on its consensus 
politics and absence of conflict? And what does 
it mean for Chilean politics and democracy more 
broadly? By some accounts, the protests reflect 
a deep disconnect between the country’s politi-
cal elites—who have emphasized restraint, mod-
eration, and neoliberal orthodoxy—and ordinary 
citizens, who are increasingly concerned about in-
equality, economic vulnerability, and social mobil-
ity. In that sense, they also symbolize the failure of 
Chilean political parties on both left and right to 
channel conflict and represent citizens’ demands.
In another interpretation, the protests are evi-
dence that the country’s democracy has succeeded 
on some fronts but fallen short on others. The new 
demands demonstrate that social policy reforms 
enacted during the 1990s and early 2000s failed to 
live up to citizens’ expectations. But they also un-
derscore how the slow expansion of the state cre-
ated new social rights, empowering calls for redis-
tribution. In this view, the question looming over 
Chile is whether the country’s political parties and 
elites will adapt to these new demands, put an end 
to the elitist politics that defined the period after 
the democratic transition, and embrace a more 
participatory form of governance. Both interpre-
tations hold some truth, but initial evidence sug-
gests a strong resistance to change among elites, 
setting the stage for a political crisis.
The recent wave of protests may come as a sur-
prise to those aware of Chile’s reputation for good 
governance, high growth, and strong democracy. 
Its achievements have indeed been impressive by 
some measures. Between 1990 and 2015 the econ-
omy grew at an average annual rate of 3.5 percent, 
with only two years of contraction in a quarter-
century. As incomes rose, the share of individu-
als living in poverty declined from 38.6 percent 
in 1990 to 7.8 percent in 2013. On the political 
front, Chile is also considered a success, with low 
rates of corruption and healthy democratic com-
petition. Transparency International ranks the 
country among the world’s 25 least corrupt states. 
The Varieties of Democracy index scores Chile as 
highly democratic in most respects, including pro-
tection of civil liberties and rule of law.
CAUTIOUS CENTER-LEFTISTS
Since the return to democracy in 1990, Chile 
has been led by a series of center-left govern-
ments; the right held the presidency for only one 
term (2010–14). The center-left administrations 
of the 1990s and early 2000s modified social wel-
fare policies, expanding coverage and making 
benefits more generous. But none of the reforms 
dismantled the underlying structures put in place 
by the military dictatorship. During Pinochet’s 
rule, Chile became a poster child for neoliber-
alism, radically reforming the economy and the 
welfare state, privatizing pensions and partially 
privatizing education and health care. Following 
the democratic transition, the center-left parties 
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were cautious with reforms, hesitant to increase 
taxes or significantly expand the role of the state 
in the provision of services.
This moderation was beneficial in some respects, 
since it allowed the center-left to secure policy re-
forms despite the conservative tilt of the Senate 
and strong opposition from the well-organized 
business sector to any deviation from neoliberal or-
thodoxy. Still, this meant that social policy reforms, 
while important, could neither reach full universal 
coverage nor completely break with deeply rooted 
inequalities.
The center-left’s cautious approach to social re-
form is explained in part by political constraints 
and policy legacies. The country’s right-wing par-
ties, National Renovation and the Independent 
Democratic Union, are strong and have resisted 
efforts to reduce the private sector’s role in edu-
cation, health care, and pensions. Moreover, the 
1980 constitution, which was written by Pinochet 
and his allies, provided advantages to the right. 
The binomial electoral system, under which the 
candidates who finished first and second in a dis-
trict each received a seat, all but ensured a divided 
Congress. Designated senators, who were named 
by Pinochet before he left office, gave the right en-
during control of the Senate.
While these constraints influenced social policy 
outcomes in the 1990s and early 2000s, the moder-
ate approach to reform also reflected the character 
of the country’s center-left political parties. Chile’s 
left-leaning parties are elitist in their organization, 
with weak ties to the voting base and limited space 
for participation. Their structures protect elites 
from pressures from below. As a result, the parties’ 
policy-making process is insulated, involving con-
sultation with technical experts and officials from 
the Finance Ministry, but little societal input.
Between 1990 and 2013, Chile’s center-left co-
alition, the Concertación, was made up of the So-
cialist Party (PS), the Christian Democratic Party 
(PDC), the Party for Democracy, and the Social 
Democratic Radical Party. The two largest parties 
in the Concertación, the PS and the PDC, were 
political rivals before the bloody 1973 coup led 
by Pinochet, when Socialist President Salvador 
Allende was killed in a military assault on the 
presidential palace. After the coup, PS leaders 
and other leftists were detained, disappeared, or 
forced into exile.
During the years in exile, Socialist elites en-
gaged in reflection and renovation. When the par-
ty returned to the political scene in the 1980s, it 
had divided into two factions. One saw the coup as 
partly the result of the party’s radicalization and its 
unwillingness to compromise. This group stressed 
a need for moderation during the political transi-
tion and in the early years of democracy. The sec-
ond faction maintained a more traditional leftist 
stance, questioning Pinochet’s neoliberal reforms 
more directly. 
The more moderate, renovated faction eventu-
ally won control of the party. The organizational 
structure of the PS, which limits the power of mili-
tants and grassroots groups, allowed these market-
friendly elites to pursue the centrist politics that 
dominated the 1990s and early 2000s. The result 
was that the social policy reforms adopted by So-
cialist presidents Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006) and 
Michelle Bachelet (2006–10) expanded the role 
of the state in health care, pensions, and educa-
tion, but within the limits of existing revenue and 
without eliminating or further regulating private 
providers.
SHRINKING PENSIONS
One of Chile’s most celebrated social policy ini-
tiatives was Bachelet’s 2008 reform of the pension 
system, which was privatized in 1981 during the 
Pinochet dictatorship. Under the private system, 
workers are required to contribute 10 percent of 
their earnings to an individual account, managed 
by a private pension-fund administrator (AFP). The 
Pinochet law eliminated employer contributions 
and left AFPs virtually unregulated. It also institut-
ed a system of social assistance pensions for work-
ers whose contributions were insufficient. But the 
benefit was narrowly targeted and many Chileans 
reached the end of their working years without a 
guaranteed pension.
In response to growing discontent about cov-
erage gaps and inadequate benefit size, Bachelet 
reformed the system, creating a state-guaranteed 
minimum pension for the bottom 60 percent of 
income earners. Her initiative increased the value 
of the benefit and supplemented contributions for 
women and young workers.
Still, the size of an average Chilean pension re-
mains small by international standards. A 2015 
government report found that the average pension 
value between 2007 and 2014 was around $126 per 
month, representing an income replacement rate of 
45 percent. The study also generated projections 
suggesting that benefit values are likely to decline 
in the coming 20 years, with replacement rates 
dropping to an average of 37 percent in 2025–35.
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The inadequacy of benefits is confirmed by 
public opinion polls, which show that around 70 
percent of respondents believe that their private 
pension will not cover their living expenses. Simi-
larly, 60 percent say they worry about having to 
rely on private savings and 57 percent believe the 
private firms are not capable of effectively manag-
ing funds.
This growing sense of vulnerability among 
large sectors of the population is one factor that 
motivated the August protests, but the “No More 
AFP” movement also seeks to address profound in-
equalities in the pension system. Just before the 
August demonstration, news reports revealed that 
a retiree from the prison police force who was the 
former wife of a Socialist Party politician received 
a monthly retirement payment of $7,800, nearly 
62 times the average pension.
That disclosure drew attention to multiple lay-
ers of inequality built into the pension system. 
First, the fact that military and police pensions 
were not privatized during the dictatorship means 
that retirees from those ser-
vices enjoy greater income 
protection than others do. 
Second, since the country’s 
private system relies on in-
dividual savings, the value 
of a worker’s pension is di-
rectly related to his or her 
labor income. Often, individuals who have an ir-
regular work history and low wages are unable 
to save enough to finance a decent pension. This 
problem is especially stark for women, who are 
more likely to earn lower wages and leave the la-
bor market for periods of time. In essence, Chile’s 
privatized pension system tends to perpetuate and 
exacerbate labor-market inequalities among work-
ers during their retirement years.
In the wake of the “No More AFP” movement, 
Bachelet proposed a series of further reforms to the 
pension system, including the creation of a public 
fund administrator, the introduction of employer 
contributions, and tightening regulations on pri-
vate fund administrators. While these changes 
would improve the system, they are unlikely to lead 
to significant growth in benefits for most Chileans, 
unless the new employer contributions are used to 
finance the public, state-guaranteed benefit.
UNEQUAL EDUCATION
Inequality is not unique to old-age income se-
curity. It permeates Chilean social policy more 
broadly, including an approach to education that 
is rooted in the Pinochet era. Beginning in 2006, 
the country witnessed a wave of intense student 
protests demanding reforms to primary, secondary, 
and tertiary education. These protests continued 
in subsequent years, peaking in 2011.
Pinochet’s reforms of the educational system, 
much like his pension reforms, sought to reduce 
the role of the state in providing and paying for so-
cial services. In 1980, the regime decentralized the 
administration of primary and secondary schools 
and altered the financing mechanism, most notably 
through the adoption of a voucher system. Under 
the law, the state finances education through a per-
pupil voucher payment that can be used by par-
ents to send their children to a purely public (mu-
nicipal) school or a subsidized private school. The 
original law allowed private schools to charge a 
co-payment on top of the state voucher. They were 
also permitted to set admissions criteria. All of this 
had the effect of excluding many low-income chil-
dren from the top-performing voucher schools.
This reform led to a de-
cline in expenditures on 
public education: between 
1982 and 1990, spending 
as a share of gross domes-
tic product fell by half, to 
2.5 percent. The reform 
also resulted in a decline in 
the quality of public education, because munici-
pal schools found it difficult to finance their op-
erations with the limited funds they received from 
vouchers. Moreover, many municipalities were in-
capable of administering the funds and struggled 
with the complex task of running schools, which 
previously was the responsibility of the central 
government.
As a result, inequalities between public and 
private education deepened. Since many low- 
income families could not afford the co-payments 
charged by subsidized private schools, these in-
equalities tended to mirror differences in family 
income. The Pinochet reform also altered Chile’s 
tertiary education system, reducing state funding 
and facilitating the creation of private universities 
while subjecting them to little regulation. The re-
form liberalized the rules governing tuition and 
allowed universities to function as for-profit en-
tities. As university enrollments grew during the 
1990s and early 2000s, many families found them-
selves deeply indebted, but with graduates who 
still struggled to find work.
None of the reforms dismantled  
the underlying structures put in  
place by the military dictatorship.
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Despite widespread recognition of the inequali-
ties generated by the Pinochet regime’s education 
policy, the Concertación governments of the 1990s 
and early 2000s were unable to restructure the sys-
tem. President Eduardo Frei’s center-left Christian 
Democratic administration (1994–2000) institut-
ed a full school day for all public-school students. 
But this did little to address gaps in the quality of 
service provided by public and private schools.
In 2009, as protests mounted, Bachelet pushed 
through a general education law, which set new 
criteria for the establishment of private schools 
and created a state monitoring agency to improve 
educational quality. The initiative also required 
more transparent admissions criteria in subsidized 
private schools, though it did not eliminate the 
practice. Student protesters were critical of the law, 
since it maintained the voucher system and failed 
to address the problem of rising tuition costs.
Although the Concertación governments left 
the underlying structure of the Pinochet-era ed-
ucation system in place, they did increase public 
spending markedly. The new 
funds contributed to notable 
growth in school enrollment, 
and by the early 2000s Chile 
had reached near-universal par-
ticipation in primary and sec-
ondary education. Enrollment 
in universities also expanded 
rapidly, with the tertiary gross enrollment ratio 
growing from 20 percent in 1990 to 86.6 percent 
in 2014.
However, this increase in university access was 
accompanied by an increase in cost, due to lim-
ited state funding. By 2005, it was estimated that 
the average tuition at a public university amount-
ed to around 22 percent of Chile’s per capita 
GDP—one of the highest ratios in the world. 
Moreover, due to the deep inequalities built into 
the primary and secondary education system, 
many low-income children did not have the test 
scores needed to attend the country’s prestigious 
public institutions or even the top tier of private 
schools. Instead, they enrolled in private univer-
sities that charged high tuition but had less estab-
lished reputations.
Discontent over high tuition costs and educa-
tional inequality continued to grow during the 
administration of center-right President Sebastián 
Piñera (2010–14). The election of 2013 saw the 
formation of a new center-left coalition, New Ma-
jority, which includes the Communist Party, and 
by extension, leaders of the student protest move-
ment. New Majority’s candidate was Bachelet, who 
won on a platform promising free university edu-
cation and progressive tax reform.
Upon returning to office for a second term, 
Bachelet reformed the tax code and secured pas-
sage of a sweeping education reform in 2015. The 
so-called gratuity law combined increased state 
funding with new regulations on tuition to pro-
vide free university access for 120,000 to 130,000 
students in 2016. Bachelet has stated that she ex-
pects to expand coverage to all students by 2020. 
The education reform is funded through general 
revenue, boosted by the 2014 tax reform, which 
increased corporate taxes.
Protest leaders note that the funding does not 
cover the full cost of attendance and argue that 
the tuition subsidy is insufficient. Other critics 
contend that the law is too costly and perpetu-
ates inequality, since it requires the state to invest 
heavily in tertiary education despite the fact that 
many Chileans, particularly the poorest, still can-
not attend university. Some also 
warn that the new regulations 
could prompt the closure of 
some universities or erode edu-
cational quality. The reform has 
drawn criticism from both the 
left and the right of the political 
spectrum. As student protests 
continue, it is clear that Bachelet’s measures have 
not succeeded in resolving these intense disputes 
over education policy.
DISTANT ELITES
Chilean social policy reforms during the 1990s 
and early 2000s produced an expansion in cover-
age and slight increases in service quality, but failed 
to eliminate the underlying market logic built into 
the education, health, and pension sectors dur-
ing the Pinochet era. The center-left parties have 
continued to demonstrate reluctance to respond to 
protesters’ demands and break with the existing 
social policy architecture. This growing distance 
between center-left political elites and their vot-
ing base is reflected in declining voter turnout, 
disaffection with political parties, and mounting 
protests.
At the start of Chile’s transition to democracy 
in 1990, around 80 percent of voters identified 
with one of the country’s main political parties. 
By 2013, only 40 percent of voters identified with 
a political party. Trust in parties also fell: 34 per-
Inequalities between  
public and private  
education deepened.
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cent of Chileans expressed confidence in parties in 
1995, but only 15 percent did in 2013.
As the appeal of traditional political parties 
declined, new actors moved into the void. In the 
2009 presidential election, Frei, the Christian 
Democratic candidate, and Piñera, the National 
Renovation candidate, faced an outside challeng-
er from the left, Marco Enríquez-Ominami. He 
won just over 20 percent of the vote in the first 
round and refused to support either of the top two 
candidates in the November runoff. Since then, 
Enríquez-Ominami has sought to build a new al-
ternative, the Progressive Party. Other new parties 
have emerged on the left (Democratic Revolution) 
and the right (Political Evolution and Amplitude).
Along with declining support for traditional po-
litical parties, voter registration and turnout also 
fell during the first 25 years of the new democracy. 
Until 2012, electoral rules provided for voluntary 
registration—but voting was compulsory. In 1988, 
as the country prepared to vote in the historic 
plebiscite that would remove Pinochet from pow-
er, voter registration soared, with 90 percent of the 
voting-age population registering to participate.
From that point forward, however, registration 
declined considerably. By 2009, only 68 percent 
of the voting-age population was registered. In 
a system of compulsory voting, the share of val-
id ballots gives a better sense of citizen support 
than turnout, since voters who are required to 
participate may protest by spoiling their ballots. 
In Chile’s 1989 parliamentary election, a mere 5 
percent of ballots were invalid, but by 1997 that 
number had grown to nearly 18 percent.
In 2012, Piñera signed a law making registra-
tion automatic but voting optional. Since then, the 
country has seen a further decline in electoral par-
ticipation. In the 2012 municipal elections, only 
43 percent of registered voters cast a ballot. That 
figure increased to 49 percent for the 2013 presi-
dential election, before collapsing to 34 percent 
for the October 2016 municipal elections. Turnout 
for the latter was so low that as few as 20 percent 
of voters showed up at the polls in some of San-
tiago’s poorest districts.
STREET POLITICS
While formal democratic participation weak-
ened during the late 1990s and early 2000s, street 
protests became more common. Beginning in 2006 
but intensifying in 2011, secondary and university 
students became increasingly mobilized, organiz-
ing strikes, school takeovers, and large-scale pro-
tests. The scale of the protests was unprecedented 
in contemporary Chile. In 2011, there were at 
least 150 distinct protests, and some rallies drew 
between 500,000 and 700,000 participants.
In addition to the student protest movement, 
Chile has witnessed the growth of feminist activism 
and more recently the “No More AFP” movement 
for pension reform. Both groups have mobilized 
large numbers of citizens. With each new protest, 
civil society has become increasingly invigorated, 
showing an impressive capacity to call people into 
the streets and pressure the government. Yet the 
demands remain poorly defined, since there is lit-
tle consensus about the movements’ central goals.
Their demands range from the elimination of 
the private pension system to a new constitution. 
In response, Bachelet’s second administration has 
not only carried out reforms to the education sys-
tem and the tax code. The government also initi-
ated a process of citizen consultation on constitu-
tional reform and has introduced a bill that would 
legalize abortion if the mother’s life is in danger, 
the pregnancy is unviable, or the woman has been 
raped. (Chile is one of just a handful of countries 
that ban abortion in all cases; just before leaving 
office, Pinochet tightened the already restrictive 
law by banning abortion in cases where the moth-
er’s life is at risk.) 
Such measures do not appear to have quelled 
discontent. The protests have continued, while 
the president’s approval ratings have plummeted. 
In 2014, at the start of her second term in office, 
around 50 percent of the population approved of 
Bachelet and only 29 percent disapproved. By Au-
gust 2016, her approval rating had dropped to 15 
percent, with 66 percent disapproving of her lead-
ership. That is the worst showing by any Chilean 
president since the return to democracy.
The lack of support for Bachelet is partly due to 
discontent on both left and right over the tax and 
education reforms, but it also reflects a corruption 
scandal that tainted the beginning of her latest 
term. The matter involved a $10 million loan taken 
out by her son and daughter-in-law one day after 
she was elected president in 2013. The loan was 
used to purchase a large plot of land just outside 
of Santiago. The land was resold shortly thereafter, 
allegedly for millions of dollars in profit. The loan 
drew attention because of its size but also because 
it was secured with help from one of Chile’s most 
prominent businessmen, Andrónico Luksic. One 
question is whether the president’s son knew the 
parcel was being rezoned, which made its resale 
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so profitable. His wife was charged with fraud in 
January 2016. The case coincided with other cor-
ruption allegations about campaign financing by 
the right-wing UDI party.
The results of the October 2016 municipal 
elections suggest that Bachelet’s low approval rat-
ings are reverberating down-ticket as well. The 
center-right Coalition for Change increased its 
share of mayors from 121 to 143 municipalities, 
including several major cities. New Majority saw 
the number of mayoral offices it controls fall from 
167 to 140. Independent candidates also made 
gains. The results have prompted many to specu-
late that Piñera, leading the Coalition for Change, 
could be poised to return to power in this year’s 
presidential election.
Yet it is not at all clear that the electorate has 
moved right in ideological terms. Instead, it 
seems that street politics and electoral politics 
have become increasingly separated in Chile. This 
trend underscores the need for parties to renovate 
themselves, or for new parties altogether. Thus 
far, the main efforts at party construction have 
been closely tied to key personalities, offering lit-
tle by way of institutional strength and program-
matic appeal.
PARTICIPATORY PARTIES?
The November presidential election will test the 
ability of the country’s parties and political elite to 
adapt and listen to voters. If the system proves too 
rigid to change, popular mobilization and protest 
are likely to define politics in the coming years.
The political system faces immense pressure to 
open itself to greater public participation. The ex-
clusionary and elitist mode of policy making that 
dominated the 1990s and early 2000s no longer 
appears to be viable. While that style of politics 
produced important social policy reforms, it also 
failed to address pressing issues or take inequality 
seriously. Parties have yet to adapt to the public’s 
new demands and allow for renovation and citizen 
participation in candidate selection, platform for-
mation, and policy reform. The fact that two of the 
front-runners for the 2017 presidential election 
are both former presidents—Sebastián Piñera and 
Ricardo Lagos—suggests that Chile’s two main co-
alitions are still in need of an overhaul.
Chile has been celebrated as an example of 
progress and democracy in Latin America. Its left-
leaning parties have been applauded for their tech-
nically savvy and “responsible” leadership. While 
all of this is true, the past five years suggest there 
is a cost to the Chilean model as well.
Alhough Chile has seen robust growth and 
declining poverty, inequality has remained stub-
bornly high. Much of the protest during the past 
five years has centered on this problem. Bachelet’s 
2015 education reform was the most radical social 
policy initiative undertaken since the country’s 
transition to democracy. Yet her response to the 
pension protests suggests that she and other mem-
bers of the PS are still hesitant to push hard against 
private-sector interests.
The Chilean experience of center-left rule dur-
ing the 1990s and early 2000s offers the lesson 
that politicians must focus on both outcomes and 
process. Elitist forms of policy making may have 
produced middle-of-the road initiatives and con-
tributed to Chile’s strong growth and popularity 
with foreign investors, but they seem to have si-
multaneously frustrated large portions of society, 
which felt their concerns and preferences were not 
being represented. The country’s recent history 
shows that process matters: even effective and so-
phisticated policies will prove insufficient if they 
are formulated in ways that are perceived as elitist 
and lacking public participation.
The challenge for Chile is to ensure that policy 
making and governance are democratized further. 
This will involve moving from a formal democ-
racy to a more participatory democratic regime. 
Such a system can only be achieved with strong 
and representative political parties that are rooted 
in society and facilitate participation and consul-
tation. The elimination of institutional constraints 
such as the binomial electoral system opens up 
possibilities for such a process. Ultimately, politi-
cal elites must accept the challenge to revamp the 
way existing parties function, build stronger ties 
with voters, and respond to demands for greater 
equality. ■
